Digital Commons @ University of
Georgia School of Law
Sibley Lecture Series

Lectures and Presentations

10-16-1985

Mass Torts and Litigious Disaster
Alvin B. Rubin
U.S. Court of Appeals

Repository Citation
Rubin, Alvin B., "Mass Torts and Litigious Disaster" (1985). Sibley Lecture Series. 54.
https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/lectures_pre_arch_lectures_sibley/54

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Lectures and Presentations at Digital Commons @
University of Georgia School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sibley Lecture Series by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited
from this access For more information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

MASS TORTS AND LITIGATION DISASTERS
Alvin B. Rubin *
Recent developments in product liability law have combined with
heightened consumer awareness and mass marketing of products to
produce a vast increase in the number of product liability suits. Highspeed mass transit, new construction methods and materials, industrial
accidents in the manufacturing of explosives and toxic chemicals, tort
law developments shifting the risk of loss, as well as the increasing
size of personal injury awards, have united in a similar fashion to
create a mammoth increase in litigation concerning single catastrophes. The disposal of hazardous wastes has also generated hundreds
of personal injury suits involving insidious diseases that may not be
manifested for years. These mass tort claims have a number of similarities: they result in the filing of many suits; they produce high litigation costs; they are generally resolved only after great delay; they
affect not only the litigants but other users of the court system; and
their total human and economic costs affect all of society.
Let us look briefly at a few of the better-known product liability
cases. Asbestos has been used since the fifth century B.C. It is basically
indestructable and is remarkably resistant to heat. More than 3000
products commonly used in the home and at work contain asbestos.
Today, however, it is regarded as "one of the most dangerous of all
United States Circuit Judge, Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. I express my appreciation to two fine lawyers each of whom devoted part of a one-year term as my
*

law clerk to assist me in thinking about this subject and in writing this article, Andrew
P. Schultz, B.A. Swarthmore College, 1979, M.S. School of Urban & Public Affairs,
Carnegie-Mellon University, 1981, J.D. University of New Mexico School of Law,
1984, who was my law clerk during the 1984-85 period, and Nancy F. Meloy, B.A.
University of Iowa, 1980, M.A. University of Virginia, 1982, J.D. University of Iowa
College of Law, 1985, who was my law clerk during 1985-86.
In preparing the speech which served as the basis for this article, I relied on a

number of sources and append a bibliography of major sources. Most of the "facts"
are widely known and many sources can be found for each. My discussion of the
state of the law and recommendations for its change, whether they are original with
me-as few are-or were espoused by someone else, must stand on their own merits
or collapse as a result of defects, latent or patent.
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natural materials."' Inhalation of asbestos fibers may cause not only
bronchial problems but also asbestosis, mesothelioma, and pulmonary
bronchogenic cancer. Since the beginning of World War II, more than
11,000,000 workers have been exposed to asbestos, and uncounted millions of others have lived in homes, attended schools, or worked in
buildings insulated with it. Various studies estimate that each year at
least 8500 and perhaps as many as 67,000 persons die from asbestosrelated causes. The number of deaths is not expected to decrease until
1990 because precautions against its dangers were not implemented until the 1960's and producers were slow in introducing substitute products. More than 30,000 suits against asbestos manufacturers have
already been filed; about one-third of these suits are in federal court.
This number includes class actions by public agencies seeking to recover the costs of removing asbestos insulation from public buildings,
litigation concerning insurance coverage, and, of course, thousands of
individual plaintiff suits. Additional suits are being filed at the rate of
2
500 a month.
Asbestos litigation has resulted in far more expense than in recovery
of damages for injured persons. A Rand Corporation study estimated
that injured persons receive less than thirty-seven percent of the total
amount spent on litigation. Almost two-thirds of the total expenditures
are for attorneys' fees and other litigation expenses. 3
Some women who have used the Dalkon Shield, a contraceptive device manufactured by the A.H. Robins Company, have suffered pelvic
inflammatory disease, spontaneous abortion, sterility, and various other
serious afflictions. The device may have also caused birth defects in
children. More than 2,000,000 women used the device, which was last
sold in the United States in 1974 and in other countries in 1975. Users
of the Dalkon Shield have filed more than 13,000 suits against Robins.
Robins has settled 8750 claims, totaling $343,000,000, but 4472 cases
are still pending. Of the 13,000 cases, only 59 have been tried. Plain-

' Special Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and Political Issues Raised
by Asbestos Litigation,38 VAND. L. REv. 573, 579 (1983) (quoting Mehaffy, AsbestosRelated Lung Disease, 16 FORUM 341, 341 (1980)).
2 Most of the data in this paragraph are taken from Special Project, supra note 1,
at 578-81.
JJ. KAKALIK, P. EBENER, W. FELSTINER, G. HAGGSTROM, M. SHANLEY, VARIATION
IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION COMPENSATION AND EXPENSES XViii-XiX (1984) (published by
the Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice).
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tiffs have won 32 of these and Robins 17.4 In August 1985, Robins,
following the lead of four asbestos manufacturers, filed a bankruptcy
petition contending that it would be unable to satisfy all pending and
potential claims.
Agent Orange is a herbicide that was used by United States military
forces in Vietnam between 1961 and 1972 to clear jungles and destroy
crops. Seven companies 5 manufactured it for the United States. After
more than 600 individual suits had been filed, the cases were consolidated into a class action, which was ultimately assigned to Chief Judge
Jack Weinstein of the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York. The class was estimated to include between
600,000 and 2.4 million persons; 2,440 persons opted out of the class
although 600 individuals later asked to be reinstated. With court approval, all of the class claims were settled in 1984 for $180,000,000.
This sum is to be divided among the persons who have manifested an
illness claimed to result from exposure to Agent Orange, persons whose
injuries will become manifest only at a later time, the children of veterans who were exposed to Agent Orange who elect to join the class,
including children not yet born, and the 4,500 plaintiffs' lawyers, whose
costs have exceeded $3,000,000 and whose fees have been set at
$10,000,000. The settlement was reached twenty-three years after the
first person was exposed to Agent Orange, twelve years after its last
use, and six and one-half years after the first suits were filed. Fortyfive appeals from this settlement are now pending. Even if the settlement is eventually approved, the distribution of funds will not begin
until late 1986 or later.
Litigation seeking to establish the liability of tobacco manufacturers
for lung cancer and other diseases started in the 1960's. So far, neither
smokers nor their heirs have collected a cent either in judgment or in
settlement. Now plaintiffs, taking advantage of changes in product liability law, have resumed litigation. Since the earlier litigation, the
doctrine of strict liability has been more fully developed, and the rule
of comparative fault has been adopted in many states, removing the

The data in this paragraph are taken from Court is Asked to Find Robins Liable
for All Dalkon-Shield Injury Claims, Wall St. J., Aug. 5, 1985, at 5, col. 2.
' Dow Chemical Company, Monsanto Company, Hercules Chemical Company,
Thompson Chemical Companies, T.H. Agriculture & Nutrition, Diamond Shamrock,
and Uniroyal Incorporated.
4
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bar to recovery formerly created by the contributory negligence rule.
In addition, the warranty to consumers has been broadened, and it is
now generally assumed that a product carries an implied warranty that
it may be safely used. These developments create a new legal environment for tobacco-created disease litigation. Smokers are not the only
litigants: in October 1985, an asbestos manufacturer sued six cigarette
manufacturers seeking contribution to damage claims on the basis that
the claimant's lung cancer had been caused by the cumulative effect of
exposure to asbestos and smoking. 6
Many other types of mass products liability claims have been filed.
Only time will reveal the claims yet to mature. Claims now in court,
as well as those that may be expected, include those of consumers who
have used the drugs benedictin and DES; veterans exposed to radiation
during military testing of atomic weapons; persons exposed to various
toxic substances, such as herbicides and pesticides; persons exposed to
contaminated ground water or to toxic wastes; persons who have inhaled benzene or gasoline fumes; and workers who have contracted
silicosis as a result of inhaling injurious substances.
Mass catastrophes present another unique demand on our tort system. The single event in which hundreds or thousands of people are
injured or killed arouses horror, sympathy, and media attention. We
all know of the Bhopal disaster in which, as a result of the release of
noxious chemicals from a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, more
than 1700 persons were killed and 200,000 were injured. When a Pan
American Boeing 727 crashed into a residential area near the New Orleans Airport on July 9, 1982, 179 people died. The collapse of a skywalk at the Hyatt Regency Hotel in Kansas City in 1981 resulted in 114
deaths and hundreds of injuries. In 1985, 500 people died in an airline
crash in Japan, 174 in a Delta Airlines crash at the Dallas airport, and
57 persons in a crash of a Midwestern Airlines plane.
Under present law, it is usually impossible for a single court or court
system to acquire jurisdiction over all the claims arising from a single
disaster, much less the use of a single product. Such claims are typically based on state law; federal courts, therefore, have jurisidiction
only when the parties are of diverse citizenship. Thus, some claims
concerning the same product or disaster may be filed in federal courts
6 The data in this paragraph are taken from Cigarettes and Cancer: Lawyers Gear
Up to Battle Tobacco Firms, Wall St. J., Apr. 29, 1985, at 27, col. 4.
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and some in state courts. When filed in state courts, the claims may
be filed in the various states where the plaintiffs reside, where the
defendants have a business situs or, in the case of a mass disaster, in
the place where the accident occurred.
Even when suits are all filed in a single court system, the court may
be unable tb conduct unitary trial proceedings. The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure and many state class action statutes cannot be utilized
for individual product liability claims because courts have found that,
generally, particular questions affecting individual members prepon-7
derate over the questions of law or fact common to all class members.
These include such questions as: Was this plaintiff exposed to the
product? Did this plaintiff have notice of the risk? Was the alleged
injury caused by use of the product? How much damage did the plaintiff suffer? This "commonality" requirement also creates a barrier to
class certification in mass disaster cases. 8 In addition, the fact that all
the victims are identified in mass disaster cases may mitigate against a
finding of the numerosity essential for a class action.
Pursuant to statutory authority, 9 separate federal cases may be consolidated for pretrial proceedings by the panel on multidistrict litigation. The statute permits consolidation only for pretrial preparation;
in some instances, however, the parties themselves agree to try their
case in the court that conducted pretrial preparation. Whether the case
is tried by the court in which pretrial preparation is conducted or is
sent for trial to the court in which the plaintiff initially filed suit, each
case that was part of the pretrial consolidation effort must eventually
be separately tried on its own merits. Hence, the progress of litigation
is still slow.
I.

PROBLEMS IN T= PRESENT SYSTEm&

The present system is slow, inefficient, costly, and potentially unjust
both to injured parties and defendants. Let me summarize its inadequacies:

See generally Comment, Federal Mass Tort Class Actions: A Step Toward Equity and Efficiency, 47 AxL. L. REV. 1180 (1983). But see Jenkins v. Raymark Indus.,
Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986).
See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b).
' 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982).
7
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Delay

In the Eastern District of Texas, 700 asbestos cases are pending.
Despite able judicial management, the time until a case is settled or
tried is rarely less than two years. The district's need for additional
judges aggravates the problem. Some cases pending eight years still
have not been heard. Cases that are tried are frequently appealed,
adding two or three years to their span. In the Northern District of
Ohio, Judge Thomas D. Lambros, with the aid of two special masters,
Professors Eric D. Green and Francis E. McGovern, has crafted a
management schedule for asbestos cases that is, to us who are judges
and lawyers, a model. Nonetheless, it allows each case 480 days for
discovery and preparation for trial. Another example of delay is the
litigation arising from the Pan Am plane crash near New Orleans on
July 9, 1982. The airline conceded liability; the only litigated issue was
the amount of damages due each claimant, and yet, at the time of this
writing, only two-thirds of the cases filed have been finally concluded.
B. Expense
As I have mentioned, in asbestos-related litigation more than twice
the amount recovered by injured persons is spent in the opposing efforts of plaintiffs' and defendants' counsel to increase and reduce that
amount of recovery. Asbestos-exposure litigation is not unique. According to calculations derived from a 1977 United States Insurance
Service Office survey, for every dollar paid to claimants in product
liability cases, insurers paid an average of forty-two cents in defense
costs. Claimants paid a contingent fee averaging thirty-three cents, in
addition to litigation expenses. The costs of litigation (apart from those
furnished by the taxpayer in providing a free legal system) are more
than twice the amount of the net recovery by successful claimants. 0
A Rand Corporation study reached a similar conclusion: the study
found that for every fifty-nine dollars paid to claimants in product
liability cases, ninety-nine dollars is paid by both claimants and
defendants just for legal services."
1oThese data are derived from

SENATE COMM. ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND

S. REP. No. 476, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1984).
JJ. KAKALIK, P. EBENER, W. FELSTINER, M. SHANLEY, COSTS OF ASBESTOS LITIOATION (1983) (published by the Rand Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice).
TRANSPORTATION, PRODUCT LurniTY ACT REPORT,
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This litigation industry benefits successful claimants, but it also rewards lawyers, both those asserting claims and those defending against
them. Yet neither group of lawyers should be seriously faulted.
Defendants' counsel are not villains for tenaciously resisting demands
on their clients, nor are plaintiffs' counsel evil for attempting to secure
all that the law allows for injured claimants. These lawyers are only
making diligent efforts to protect those whom they are hired to represent, to exploit the strategic tactics and manipulation that the present
rules permit, and to earn the fees they are paid. Neither group of
lawyers, however, deserves medals of honor. While the recompense of
some is contingent, all are working for a monetary reward that is,
more often than not, very substantial.
C. Insurance Costs
Apart from the actual payments made-to injured persons and defense costs, uncertainties in product liability law add to the cost of
product liability insurance and put financial pressure on insurance
companies. Some members of Congress have noted that, in the past,
product liability insurance and other costs of product liability litigation
have amounted to only one percent of sales. Within the past year,
however, the cost of such insurance has vastly increased and some
potential defendants may soon be unable to buy insurance at any price.
Product liability insurers' losses (and the losses of other casualty companies) have been so great that 400 insurance companies are on the
"watch-lists" of various state insurance commissioners. Higher insurance rates reflect the unpredictability of the legal standards that
may apply in future claims against manufacturers and product sellers.
The rising cost of insurance is also, of course, passed on to consumers
in the form of higher prices. And this is as it should be, for loss
distribution is the primary rationale for imposing liability on product
manufacturers regardless of fault.
D. NationalEconomy
Uncertainties in the product liability litigation system also adversely
affect the national economy. Legal expenses incurred by manufacturers to keep abreast of variations and changes in the law divert resources from production efforts and product research. Management
time is devoted to the assessment of legal claims rather than to efficient
production. In addition, the vagaries of product liability tort law may
deter the development of new or improved products: in some in-

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:429

stances, product improvement has been used to prove that an earlier
product was defective.
Some businesses have eliminated a particular product line because
the costs of product liability exposure have become too burdensome.
For example, anti-polio vaccine, for reasons unknown, causes a small
but predictable number of cases of polio, sometimes afflicting the parents of the vaccinated child. The suffering of those who contract polio
is real. But the cost of their suits is mounting to the extent that it may
make the vaccine prohibitively expensive.
E. International Trade
American manufacturers and product sellers generally pay product
liability insurance rates twenty times higher than those in Europe. While
this rate differential is due in part to the greater protection accorded
American consumers, it is also partly attributable to the uncertainty
and higher operational expenses in our tort litigation system, and the
prospect of punitive damages awards. Foreign producers are generally
not subject to these expenses, except those arising from litigation in
this country. Higher American expenses are necessarily reflected in the
price of American goods, which, in turn, adversely affects the balance
of trade.
F. Justice
A just legal system would allot the benefits and costs of tort litigation rationally and equitably. It would assure that persons suffering
similar injuries receive comparable compensation. The present American system, however, includes numerous elements that preclude such
predictability and comparability. For example, the availability of punitive damages diminishes the probability of like awards for those in
like circumstances. Even judge and jury awards of compensatory damages for like injuries differ vastly.
When and where a claim is filed may also affect a claimant's potential award. At some point, the potential and actual damage awards
may loom so large that the depletion of the assets of some defendants
and their insurers is a real concern. If the assets of a business are
insufficient to satisfy all claimants, they may be distributed on a firstcome, first-served basis. That may be a fine way to run a movie theater, but it is hardly a fair way to recompense injury. It is possible that
the asbestos manufacturers and the drug manufacturers who have
sought refuge in bankruptcy do have assets sufficient to satisfy all the
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claims against them, although that has not yet been demonstrated. A
special master appointed by the bankruptcy court in which the Johns
Manville action is pending, however, has proposed that Johns Manville in effect turn over eighty percent of its corporate equity to claimants. This proposal may not be accepted, but it indicates that, even
if all claims against it are compromised, Johns Manville is close to
insolvency. 12
Another element of injustice in our present tort litigation scheme
arises from the standard of proof of causation necessary to establish
a claim. In toxic substance cases, each claimant must establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the toxic substance caused his injury. Rarely is a particular toxic agent the exclusive cause of a disease.
As Professor David Rosenberg has emphasized, most insidious diseases may be caused by a number of factors, each of which may not
by itself have been sufficient to bring about the condition or each of
which may not be identifiable as its single cause.' 3 Statistical evidence
may show only the probability of causation. If a plaintiff can show
only a likelihood that exposure to the substance caused or contributed
to his injury, he can recover nothing.
The same rule may work injustice on defendants. If the toxic agent
can be shown to have been "more likely than not" the cause of the
plaintiff's injury, even though the probability is only fifty-one percent,
the manufacturer may be held liable on all of the damages. This is
true even though background risks might have been responsible, say,
for forty-nine percent of the reported cases. If 100 claimants sued, the
manufacturer would be liable for all their damages, even though fortynine percent of the claimants would have contracted the disease had
4
they never used the accused's product.
Proof of causation is further complicated by scientific uncertainty.
Existing product liability law may expect too much of scientists. In
the absence of scientific activity about causation, the courts may dilute
traditional causation requirements with such doctrinal devices as mod12 Manville Alternative Reorganization Proposal Could Result in Stock Dilution
of as Much as 80%, Wall St. J., May 17, 1984, at 61, col. 3.
"1 Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARv. L. REv. 849, 856-58 (1984).
" For a discussion of such problems and one proposed solution, see Note, Industry-Wide Liability and Market Share Allocation of Damages, 15 GA. L. REv. 423
(1981).
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ifying the meaning of "preponderance of the evidence" and by finding
causation through aggregate statistics when a specific causal connection to individual harm cannot be shown.
II.

PROCEDURES PRESENTLY IN USE"'

Accutely aware of the need for reform, some lawyers and judges
have attempted to improve our present methods. Let me summarize
briefly some of the procedural devices presently used to adjudicate
mass torts.
A.

ManagerialRole for Judges

While there has been some dissent,' 6 most lawyers and commentators want judges to become managers of the litigation process, and
judges have themselves responded to that demand. The recent amendment of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure reflects the
view that the judge, while still remaining neutral with regard to substantive issues, should assume an active role in shaping the case for
trial, defining the issues, and controlling discovery. The Manual for
7
Complex Litigation (Second) supports this view.
B.

Organization of Lawyers

Particularly in mass litigation, both plaintiff and defense attorneys
have begun to organize their efforts and exchange data. In class actions, the single lawyer working autonomously has been replaced by
court-appointed and court-supervised counsel. An elaborate structure
of committees is created, including lead counsel and teams of discovery counsel. Plaintiffs' counsel sometimes avoid class and multidistrict
actions in an effort to preserve the supposed sanctity of each plaintiff's
(and lawyer's) case and to safeguard the individual lawyer's potentially
higher fees. While jealously guarding their individual cases, these lawyers have developed voluntary groups to share helpful information.
Defense lawyers are also using regional or national management

"1 This section borrows from McGovern, Management of Multiparty Toxic Tort
Litigation; Case Law and Trends Affecting Case Management, 19 FORUM 1 (1983).
This article contains an exhaustive listing of cases.
16 See generally Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374 (1982) (the
problems raised by managerial judging are too important to be left to the discretion
of judges alone).

7 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION

§ 33.21 (2d ed. 1985).
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schemes to share information and trial techniques. The defendants
themselves are coordinating their strategy in order to present a united
front. On both sides, specialized counsel are more frequently appearing as trial counsel in suits that once would have been tried by less
experienced local counsel.
C. Class Actions
The most potentially useful device for handling multiple claims by
a single court is the class action under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, a rule that has a counterpart in some but not all
states. The rule has substantial limitations. At the moment, efforts to
increase the effectiveness of class actions focus on situations in which
a limited damages fund is available. Class actions to fix and allocate
punitive damages have generally not been allowed.'
D. Multidistrict Litigation
A federal statute authorizes the consolidation of similar actions filed
in different federal district courts for pretrial procedures.' 9 But the
statute does not permit the cases to be joined for trial. Absent stipulation for a common trial, the cases must be returned for trial to the
district whence they came. Lawyers can avoid even pretrial consolidation by filing suit in a state court and joining a nondiverse defendant. If diversity or federal question jurisdiction is lacking, a federal
forum is not available. Over one hundred multidistrict cases are now
pending, and despite considerable efforts by the transferee judges, the
very nature of the cases prevents expedition. Indeed the oldest case,
though it is by no means typical, was filed in 1967.
E.

Consolidation of Cases with Joint Trial of Some Issues

Several courts have consolidated numerous asbestos injury cases for
trial on the liability issue. If one or more defendants are found liable,
separate trials of damages claims are presented to the same jury. Z? This
is a commendable attempt at efficiency, but it is likely to also have
'1 See, e.g., In re Northern Dist. of Cal., Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liability
Litigation, 693 F.2d 847, 850-51 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983).

But see Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., Inc., 782 F.2d 468 (5th Cir. 1986).
,9 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (1982).
See Hendrix v. Celotex Corp., Cv. 479-237 (S.D. Ga); Neal v. Carey Canadian
Mines Ltd., 548 F. Supp. 357 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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substantive impact: although the jury may be more likely to perceive
the plaintiffs' proof that asbestos is defective and that it caused their
harm as stronger, it may also tend to cluster awards about a median
amount. A lower average verdict is the probable result.
F.

Other Management Devices

Other management devices to expedite and simplify mass litigation
include: (1) intensive use of pretrial procedures; (2) scheduling of test
cases so as to create precedents and a groundwork for collateral estoppel; (3) the employment of parajudicials, such as magistrates and
special masters; (4) the appointment of court-designated experts; and
(5) resort to alternative, nonjudicial, dispute resolution. 2' Although
each of these approaches is useful and has ameliorated the mass litigation situation, each has some disadvantages. First, they may increase the cost of litigation. Second, the use of special masters may
also raise serious questions of due process concerning the relationship
of master to judge and the absence of traditional institutional constraints on the court, with personality, ability, and courage of judge
and master alike being key variables. Finally, litigants are understandably reluctant, particularly in an emotionally-charged case like Agent
Orange, to accept any management device and may insist upon a full
blown trial. The arsenal of weapons for attack on the problems generated by mass litigation needs to be both better utilized and better
stocked.
III.

SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS: THE ORGANIZED BAR

Recognizing the problematic state of our tort litigation system, the
American Bar Association appointed a special committee on the Tort
Liability System. After two years of study, the committee reported
that the present tort litigation system is "vital and responsive as a
working process." Of the seventeen recommendations made in the report, none proposes drastic change. The only suggestion that directly
addresses mass tort litigation calls for special procedures to handle
"[e]xceptional circumstances, for example those arising from catastrophic occurrences or from chains of events otherwise generating
many cases with closely related facts." 22

21

McGovern, supra note 15.

21THE SPECIAL COMM. ON THE TORT. LIAB. Sys., TOWARDS A JURISPRUDENCE OF
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The dilemma is clear. The reforms essential to speedy and inexpensive determination of mass torts, like any other major change in tort
law, have been blocked by a lack of consensus concerning the substance of reforms and the opposition of those who are so close to the
present system that they cannot perceive its defects. As Dean Richard
Pierce has said, "No consensus is likely to develop because neither
potential accident victims nor society at large has an effective voice
in the lawmaking process."' '

IV.

REFORMS

All of the procedural devices presently available are, even when employed by the ablest lawyers and judges, but palliatives. The immanent
problems cannot be solved without changes in both substantive and
procedural law. Law reform, particularly the reform of established
legal principles and institutions that have been so advantageous for
legal professionals, has many opponents, few advocates (literally or
professionally), and is beset with obstacles and objections. An illness
so systemic cannot be remedied by symptomatic treatment or mild
analgesics.
Let me state my thesis: the traditional two-party adversary system
was not developed and can no longer function efficiently or fairly to
adjudicate mass injury and mass catastrophe cases under presently applicable substantive and procedural rules. 24 As Dean Pierce has stated,
"It is no secret that tort law performs all of its primary functions
poorly." 25 No secret, that is, to anyone but to those of us who, as
lawyers and judges, have come to accept the familiar. The primary
functions of tort law are compensation of victims and deterrence of
wrongs. Modern tort law performs neither task adequately. "Its deterrent effect is weak and uneven at best .... Its compensation system
is seriously inadequate. It only sometimes compensates, often undercompensates, and rarely provides timely compensation. "16 Today's tort

INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMER-

TORT LAW § 13-1 to -10 (1984) (Report to the American Bar Association, M.
Shapo reporter).
Pierce, InstitutionalAspects of Tort Reform, 73 CALF.L. REV.917, 918 (1985).
24 Cf. Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REV. 937 (1975) (contrasting two models, behavior modification and conflict resolution, for governing civil
actions).
Pierce, supra note 23, at 917.
Id. at 917 n. 1 (citation omitted).
ICAN
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litigation is hand-to-hand combat. Its conduct is based on a passive,
case-by-case, private law process of adjudication that has not been
modified to accommodate changes in the bases for liability.
An injured party certainly deserves full recompense, and it is better
that innocent victims be compensated than that the culpable be sheltered. Our society, however, now favors the distribution of risk and
spreading the cost of injury among producers. Whether or not we
favor imposing the cost on consumers, the consumer is likely eventually to bear the cost. Little or no regard is given to the fault of those
immediately cast in judgment, and liability is imposed independent of
any fault on the part of those on whom the cost is ultimately imposed.
This change from punishing the guilty to compensating the innocent
and imposing the risk of loss on those who are able to bear and distribute it has been superimposed on a legal system previously geared
to invidualized damage adjudication. The momentum of seeking what
associations of plaintiffs' attorneys call the "adequate award" has
resulted in ever-increasing judgments. If the right to recompense bears
little or no relationship to fault, and if damages are to be awarded
purely on a spread-the-risk basis, the quantum of damages awarded
in individual cases should be limited. At the same time, risk distribution should be made more nearly complete by modifying the burden
of proof of causation. Liability for toxic-substance injury, for example, should perhaps be imposed, and compensation distributed, in
proportion to the probability of causation assigned to the excess disease risk in exposed populations. These proposed changes should not
sound novel to most lawyers. Similar steps were taken when workers'
compensation laws were adopted by the states.
In a thoughtful paper, Judge Jack B. Weinstein has suggested that
optimum handling of mass torts can be achieved only if seven changes
27
in our present methods are made:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The decisionmaking of the parties is concentrated.
The litigation is in a single forum before a single judge.
A single set of substantive legal principles is applicable.
The tribunal has adequate support to perform its function.
Flexible methods of fact-finding are authorized.

27 These seven general points are introduced and discussed in Weinstein, The Role
of the Court in Toxic Tort Litigation, 73 GEo. L.J. 1389, 1390-92 (1985).
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Total maximum liability for a single disaster is limited, a
method for allotting costs among the defendants is devised, and there is a sure source of funds.
7. A single distribution plan, which eliminates punitive damages and extreme claims for pain and suffering, is adopted.
I endorse all of these principles. The changes I suggest conform to
them in substance. 28
6.

A.

Uniform Substantive Law2 9

The obligations of product sellers and the rights of consumers are
governed, primarily, by the laws of the consumer's domicile. Thus
sellers' duties are determined by fifty different standards: the rights
of two consumers who are otherwise identically situated may be different because one lives in Nebraska and the other in Texas. Different
legal standards may apply in cases arising from a mass disaster as well.
For example, in an airplane crash case, where the claimant lived, where
the plane ticket was purchased, and where the crash occurred are all
factors that may affect which state's law is to govern a particular
plaintiff's case. Standards in the various states are not only different,
they are also uncertain, as is the application of statutes of limitations.
These differences lead to forum shopping by both plaintiffs' and
defendants' lawyers.
For producers who engage in national distribution, product liability
is a national, not a local, problem. They must design and market uniform products, not those made to a different specification for each
state. Defects in their products may cause injury anywhere in the nation. Fear arising from possible product defects may dramatically affect the demand for a product, as the Tylenol tampering episodes
have proven.
Consumers also deserve a uniform national standard for both the
time when their claims must be asserted and the liability for injuries
they suffer. The person who buys a product in State A, which has
restrictive rules on product liability, pays something for the claims that

Weinstein, PreliminaryReflections on Managing Disasters, II COLUM. J. ENvn.
L. -(1985).
-' For some of the ideas in this section, I have drawn on Schwartz & Bares, Federal
Reform of Product Liability Law: A Solution that Will Work, 13 CAP. U.L. Rsv.
351 (1984).
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will be made for injuries suffered by a consumer in State B, whose
rules and juries are more liberal. And the consumer in State B enjoys
a benefit paid for by the consumers in State A, whose legal benefits
are circumscribed.
Apart, therefore, from the content of a uniform federal rule, uniformity is itself desirable. The rule may simply be a direction to the
federal and state courts to apply "the principles of the common law
as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the
light of reason and experience." This is the direction given by the
Federal Rules of Evidence for determining what evidence is privileged.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an asbestos case, refused to
hold that the judiciary might itself imply a single national common
law rule. 30 Congress, however, has the power to give the courts a mandate to develop such a uniform rule. Its necessity is clear. Chief Judge
Charles Clark and I differed on whether the Fifth Circuit should certify to the United States Supreme Court the question whether federal
common law should apply to the award of punitive damages and the
accrual of latent causes of action. But I agree with him that "a flood
of interrelated actions ...

cannot properly be decided as individual

actions or under the legal rules of any single state"'" or, I add, under
the differing rules of fifty. "[D]isparate awards to early claimants can
destroy the courts' ability to do justice." '32
If given the duty and the power to apply a uniform product liability
law, the federal courts should be guided by the authoritative principles
set forth in the Restatement of Torts (Second), prepared by the American Law Institute. These principles not only codify the common law,
they have greatly influenced the law's development in every state, including our one civil law state, Louisiana.
The Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate commerce
among the states. That power has been used by Congress to establish
uniform national rules for many industries and many purposes. For
example, Congress regulates wages and hours, collective bargaining,
transportation, radio and television broadcasting, sex and race discrimination, antitrust, and food and drugs. Even when Congress has
failed explicitly to regulate a certain area of commerce, some state

3oJackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 750 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1985).
31 Id.
at 1335.
32 Id.
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regulation has been held so antipathetic to national uniformity as to
be unconstitutional.
Some commentators have expressed doubt about the constitutionality of such national legislation. It is difficult to believe that the injuries to which thousands of consumers are exposed by products
distributed and used throughout the United States have less impact on
interstate commerce than the food service in a single restaurant, condemned as a violation of the Public Accomodations Act, 33 or the effect
of wages paid and hours worked of any enterprise that employs four
or more persons, which is regulated by the Fair Labor Standards Act.Y
B. Substantive Federal Standards
Better yet, Congress should formulate a national product liability
standard, at least for products distributed in more than one or two
states. Opponents of national legislation urge that the various state
courts might interpret parts of a federal statute differently and, because the Supreme Court would not be likely to review such differences, even a national statute would produce disparate applications.
Differences would certainly exist. But it is doubtful that such inconsistencies would be of any greater significance than those that now
exist as a result of interpretation of federal laws by the twelve Circuit
Courts of Appeals. The number of differences will certainly be less
than the present multitude of differences among the fifty states. Federal courts will likely cleave to well-reasoned opinions from other circuits. From time to time the Supreme Court might be expected to
resolve the most significant differences of opinion. The inability to
achieve complete homogeneity is no reason to suffer gross disparity.
My endorsement of national legislation does not imply endorsement
of specific statutes that have been introduced. Some of these would
sacrifice the welfare of injured persons to business interests and would
accord more protection to manufacturers than the laws of most states.
Other proposals are innovative and, I think, commendable, particularly the Danforth Bill's proposal for an expedited claims procedure
involving minimal proof requirements and a limitation of damages."
In addition to a uniform product liability law, Congress should consider adopting a statute imposing a single rule for the determination
31 42

U.S.C. § 2000a (1982).
- 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1982).

11S. 1999, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1985).
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of liability and damages arising from a single mass disaster. The basis
for federal legislation governing transportation calamities is patently
interstate commerce. Other disasters affecting, say, 100 or more persons, may have sufficient impact on interstate commerce to justify
federal legislation. If not, the fact that some of the 100 or more plaintiffs reside in states other than the one in which the disaster occurred
should suffice to justify a statute conferring jurisdiction on a single
court system. This might be, as previously stated, the courts of the
state in which the disaster occurred.
C. Causation
Under prevailing tort rules, a plaintiff is entitled to full compensation if, but only if, he proves that his injury was more probably
than not caused by the defendant's actions. As I have already mentioned, this rule operates unfairly in toxic tort cases. Let us take the
case of an asbestos products worker who, twenty years after his last
exposure, develops pulmonary cancer. The evidence may show a 40%
probability that his illness was caused by inhalation of asbestos fibers
and a 60% probability that it was caused by other factors. Under
present law, he would receive no damages, and asbestos producers
would bear none of the cost of his illness. If the probabilities are
reversed, however, the injured party receives 100% redress and the
manufacturer could bear all of the costs of every such case, although
it was responsible for only 60% of them. In either case, the present
system provides no means to give the worker a fair amount of damages
and assess the manufacturer with a burden equivalent to the increase
in risk it has created.
Professor David Rosenberg has suggested a "public law" method
of handling toxic tort injuries that warrants further study 6 The public
law approach would replace the preponderance of the evidence standard with a standard of proportional liability. Courts would impose
liability and distribute compensation in proportion to the probability
that the toxic agent involved caused the disease in the exposed population, regardless of whether that probability was more or less than
fifty percent. By imposing liability based upon market share, the proportionality rule would also be used when the identity of the specific
manufacturer of the agent that contributed to the disease is unknown.
36

Rosenberg, supra note 13.
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In the public law system proposed by Professor Rosenberg, a toxic
tort claim would be treated as a class claim on behalf of all victims.
If held liable, the defendant would be required to compensate all members of the class and provide a reserve or insurance to compensate
those whose illness develops later. The system would also require remedial changes, such as the use of scheduled or nonindiviualized damages and insurance fund judgments. The cost-spreading effect would
also provide redress for those whose damages are modest in amount
and who therefore have difficulty in gaining access to the courts. Participation in class actions would be mandatory, and claimants would
either be forbidden to opt out or permitted to do so only if they are
willing to pay the court costs incurred in separate trials.
D.

Other Substantive Rules

Fair legislation would provide reasonable compensation for injured
persons; recognize the possible claims of those whose injuries are yet
inchoate; permit the prompt resolution of claims; and minimize the
difficulties involved in proving exposure to the product, causation of
injury, and the identity of the manufacturer of the product causing
the injury.
In return for those benefits to injured persons, manufacturers might
be relieved of liability for punitive damages. Punitive damages might
still have a part to play, even in a risk-distribution system, to punish
the willful or grossly negligent, but in such cases awards of punitive
damages should be limited in amount and distributed to the class or
group of injured persons, not treated as individual bounties. In fact,
the private attorney general who seeks out the wrongdoer is typically
the lawyer not the client. Charging attorney's fees to the manufacturer
would accomplish the desired societal benefit without mulcting defendants.
These changes might be accompanied by a change in the manner of
computing individual damages. Compensatory damages might be limited in amount. 37 An injured person should receive adequate reimbursement for all actual damages, but the award for psychic injury
and pain and suffering might be limited. At least in product liability
cases, some limitation might be imposed on the collateral source rule,
which computes damages without regard to other sources of compen-

37 See,

e.g., Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1982).
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sation. The award might be paid on a monthly schedule to the injured
person and, in the event of death caused or accelerated by the injury,
to his surviving beneficiaries.38
If a uniform law of this type were enacted, many injured persons
would receive less than they would receive if they were permitted to
litigate their claims under the presently applicable law of the states in
which they live. Others would receive more. Nonetheless, consumers
as a group and the nation as a whole would gain substantial benefits.
Uniformity, predictability, even-handed justice, and lower prices benefit everyone. Awards, even if they may be smaller, will be paid more
quickly, with less uncertainty and less litigation expense.
Furthermore, federal statutes need not aggravate the workload
problem of federal courts. The Danforth Bill, like previously proposed
federal legislation, does not create federal court jurisdiction and leaves
the resolution of product liability claims to state courts except those
that might be brought in federal courts based on diversity jurisdiction.39
E. Workers' Compensation
Uniformity in protecting consumers should be accompanied by
greater protection for workers injured or killed by exposure to insidious disease in the course of their employment. The American Insurance Association has issued a comprehensive report calling for reform
in the area of workers' compensation as an indirect way to attack the
tort law crisis. This is worth debate. I do not suggest that federal
legislation preempt state workers' compensation laws. Federal legislation might, however, require state laws to provide benefits for workers who suffer from insidious disease. This requirement would assure
all workers some protection and might alleviate problems of proof of
causation and other present barriers. 4°
F. Class Action Changes
Whatever changes are made, or not made, in the substantive law,
the class action rules should be revised for mass tort cases to give
11For discussion of such legislation, see U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY
TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL REPORT VII 64-84 (1978); see also Schwartz
& Bares, supra note 29.

" S. 1999, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). See S. 44, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983);
H.R. 2729, 98th Cong., Ist Sess. (1983).
See Locke, Adapting Workers' Compensation to the Special Problems of OccupationalDisease, 9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 249 (1985).
41
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jurisdiction to a single forum. This change might be accomplished
either by a statute that gives federal courts jurisdiction over mass tort
actions, or by a federal statute that creates such a device for use in
state courts. The right to opt out should be eliminated or restricted
perhaps to those who can show grave hardship or who are willing to
pay the full costs of litigation in another forum. Conflicting state and
federal jurisdiction might be eliminated by providing for removal of
mass tort cases pending in state courts or by "reverse removal" of
federal cases to a state court so that all cases could be tried in one
forum. Questions concerning both the constitutionality of such provisions and the details of their operation are apparent. Yet these questions seem to me to be answerable.
G. Jury Trial
The seventh amendment to the Constitution guarantees the right to
a jury trial of tort claims against private parties. The typical jury panel
includes many jurors who may not be capable of understanding complex issues. In such cases, counsel should suggest or trial judges should
attempt to induce counsel to stipulate that only jurors having certain
qualifications will be selected. If, for example, counsel stipulate that
no person shall be called that does not have a college degree, the jury
clerk can select and call only persons who have that education and
background by examining the juror qualification form. In districts that
use computers to choose venires, it is possible to program the computer to make such a selection. Special care can be taken that, notwithstanding use of selection criteria, the selection of those who have
the necessary criteria is random and the jury remains a cross section
of that part of the community. Professors Luneburg and Nordenberg
also suggest the possibility that a similar type of "blue ribbon" jury
might be selected on the court's order if permitted by a statute without
4
violating the seventh amendment. '
CONCLUSION

Innocent victims of product injuries must be protected. They must
receive prompt and fair compensation for their injuries. Even when

41 Luneburg & Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping With the Complexities of Modern Civil Litigation,
67 VA. L. REv. 887, 942 passim (1981).
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manufacturers are without fault, manufacturers and ultimately consumers should pay the cost of injury of persons whose lives are altered
as a result of their use of products that prove to be deleterious. The
victims of mass disasters should also be accorded prompt and fair
recompense. I do not suggest less, but I do recommend that we eliminate the roulette-wheel characteristics of our present mode of adjudication.
Wrongdoers and even those who inflict injury without fault should
make their victims whole, but they need not make some rich while
leaving others undercompensated. They should adequately compensate
all those whom they contributorily injure. When causation cannot be
precisely determined but probability can, damages from exposure to
toxic and other damaging products should be assessed on a proportional basis. The rights and liabilities of all those involved in mass
torts and mass disasters should be determined expeditiously and without excessive expense.
The changes necessary to accomplish those results will be opposed
by all who find advantage in our present system, not because they are
greedy or shortsighted, but because they believe fervently in the fairness of litigating one claim at a time, whatever the cost and whatever
the delay. Meanwhile, the opponents of major change will propose
minor repairs to our bizarre structure. It is for the rest of us, the
consumers, the potential victims, and the contributo:rs who will bear
the extravagant costs, to insist upon change.

1986]

MASS TORTS
BIBLIOGRAPHY

I have borrowed freely from ideas expressed in each of these books
and articles although I also differ with many of the views expressed.
Even then, my inner debate has helped me better to articulate my own

view. Expressing my indebtedness to the authors, I cite them here rather
than in specific footnotes.

Abraham & Merrill, Scientific Uncertainty in the Courts, IssuEs Sci.
& TECH., Winter 1986, at 93.
Green, The Inability of Offensive Collateral Estoppel to Fulfill Its
Promise: An Examination of Estoppel in Asbestos Litigation, 70
IowA L. REv. 141 (1984).
Huber, Bhopalization of U.S. Tort Law, IssuEs Sci. & TECH., Fall
1985, at 73.
Locke, Adapting Workers' Compensation to the Special Problems of
OccupationalDisease, 9 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 249 (1985).
Luneburg & Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities of
Modern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L. Rnv. 887 (1981).
McGovern, Management of Multiparty Toxic Tort Litigation: Case
Law and Trends Affecting Case Management, 19 FoRuMri 1 (1983).
O'Connell, Alternatives to the Tort System for Personal Injury, 23
SAN DiEo L. REv. 17 (1986).
Pierce, InstitutionalAspects of Tort Reform, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 917
(1985).
Posner, Can Lawyers Solve the Problems of the Tort System?, 73
CALr. L. REv. 747 (1985).
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 Hhv.L. REv. 851 (1984).

452

GEORGIA LAW RE VIEW

[Vol. 20:429

Schwartz & Bares, Federal Reform of Product Liability Law: A Solution that Will Work, 13 CAP. U.L. REv. 351 (1984).
Scott, Two Models of the Civil Process, 27 STAN. L. REv. 937 (1975).
THE SPECIAL COMM. ON THE TORT LIAB.

Sys., ToWARDS A JURIS-

PRUDENCE OF INJURY: THE CONTINUING CREATION OF A SYSTEM OF

SUBSTANTIVE JUSTICE IN AMERICAN TORT LAW

§ 13-1 to -10 (1984)

(Report to the American Bar Association, M. Shapo reporter).
Trangsrud, JoinderAlternatives in Mass Tort Litigation, 70 CORNELL
L. REv. 779 (1985) (Footnote 18 in this article cites a number of
relevant books and other articles.).
Twerski, A Moderate and RestrainedFederal Product Liability Bill:
Targeting the Crisis Areas for Resolution, 18 J.L. REFORM 575
(1985).
Vairo, Multi-tort Cases: Causefor More Darkness on the Subject, or
a New Role for Federal Common Law?, 54 FoRDHAm L. REv. 167
(1985).
Weinstein, PreliminaryReflections on Managing Disasters, 11 COLUM.

J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1985).
Weinstein, The Role of the Court in Toxic Tort Litigation, 73 GEo.
L.J. 1389 (1985).
Special Project, An Analysis of the Legal, Social, and PoliticalIssues
Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 VAND. L. REv. 573 (1983).
Note, Mass Exposure Torts: An Efficient Solution to a Complex Problem, 54 CN. L. REv. 467 (1985).
Note, Risk Contribution: An Undesirable New Method for Apportioning Damages in the DES Cases, 10 J. CORP. L. 743 (1985).
Note, After the Hyatt Tragedy: Rethinking PunitiveDamages in Mass
DisasterLitigation, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 64 (1983).

19861

MASS TORTS

453

Comment, Federal Mass Tort Class Actions: A Step Toward Equity
and Efficiency, 47 ALB. L. Rv. 1180 (1983).
Business Struggles to Adapt as Insurance Crisis Spreads, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 21, 1986, at 31, col. 1.
APPENDIX

Pro cui bono?
"[R]epresenting plaintiffs who have been injured by the myriad
chemicals in the modern environment involves an enormous investment of time and money-at great risk of no recovery. The stakes are
high enough, however, to attract the adventurous [lawyer]." U.S. Law
Week, August 13, 1985, 54 L.W. 2095 (reviewing the 1985 program
of the American Trial Lawyers' Environmental and Toxic Tort Litigation Section).

